Семейные фирмы, банковские отношения и финансовые ограничения: комплексная оценочная карта

"Список членов Шведской академии еще откровеннее — там поколение за поколением фигурируют одни и те же фамилии, составляющие добрую половину ее членов. И это не ученые и писатели, а политики с родословными, уходящими куда-то в викингскую даль."


Family Firms, Bank Relationships and Financial Constraints: A Comprehensive Score Card, International Economic Review, forthcoming

Alexander Karaivanov, Simon Fraser University
Jesu ́s Saurina, Bank of Spain
Robert M. Townsend, MIT

We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they
are family-owned, not family-owned, or belong to a family-linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks).

Based on the estimated financial regime, we show that family firms, especially those belonging to networks based on ownership, are associated with a more flexible market or contract environment and are less financially constrained than non-family firms.

Family firms are better able to allocate funds and smooth investment across states of the world and over time, arguably done informally or using the cash flow generated at the level of the network. 


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