golos_dobra (golos_dobra) wrote,

Когда Падет Китай

Одна из первых статей, прямо мотивированных нашей, впервые
представленной на престижной конференции у федов аж осенью 2011-го года,
когда президент федов особо ее отметил как сногсшибательную интонацию в
макроэкономике нового поколения, естественно
лет через 10-15 после окончательной
публикации в этом году все это идейно войдет прочно в мейнстрим,
слишком поздно для меня лично, увы.



Capital Misallocation in China: Financial Frictions or Policy Distortions?
Guiying Laura Wu

Using matched samples made of firms with balanced covariates, we then evaluate some popular hypotheses on why there are policy distortions in China after all. These hypotheses include that the investment promoting program favors firms (i) contributing more tax revenue, (ii) exporting, (iii) belonging to upstream industries, (iv) having a lower beta and (v) being politically connected with the Communist Party. We find that hypothesis (i) is always rejected; (ii), (iii), and (v) are always confirmed; while (iv) is verified only in earlier years.

Таких работ должно быть больше, таких работ должно быть лучше, но и первые так сказать
ласточки воодушевляют.

Хотя статья слабовата, но ход мысли и сама постановка исследовательской темы правильные.

A stylized fact on Chinese economy is that the average marginal revenue product of capital (MRPK) differs significantly across firms with different ownership (Dollar and Wei, 2007; Song et al., 2012; Brandt et al., 2013, among many others). This distinct phenomenon has often been taken as a direct evidence of policy distortions in capital allocation. After all, ownership should not matter for MRPK in a world without policy distortions, had ownership been orthogonal to other firm characteristics that may affect MRPK. However, as a less developed economy, China also has a less developed capital market with a lagged legal, auditing and contracting environment. If firms with different ownership do systematically differ in other characteristics, such as age and size, and if such characteristics do affect MRPK because of financial frictions, even in the absence of policy distortions, these firms could still have different MRPK under an imperfect capital market. Meanwhile, the effect of policy distortions on capital misallocation could be exacerbated or mitigated by the presence of financial frictions, if those firm characteristics through which financial frictions affect MRPK are themselves affected by policy distortions. This implies that the observed MRPK dispersion across firm ownership could be the consequence of both policy distortions and financial frictions.

A structural model reveals the mechanisms that generate capital misallocation, while a non-parametric estimation avoids the potential parametric misspecification.


In this paper, we consider a structural model with both policy distortions and financial frictions. To nest those microfoundations that have been the most common building blocks of the recent literature on financial frictions and aggregate TFP, we allow for two types of highly synthesized reduced-form financial constraints. The aggregate TFP loss in our model economy depends on the dispersion of the firm-specific MRPK, which is determined by some joint distribution of a set of parameters. These parameters govern the magnitude of firm-specific policy distortions and financial frictions, and characterize the states of firm productivity and internal funds. We then conduct propensity score matching based on a set of covariates that are suggested by the model through which financial frictions may affect MRPK, even in the absence of policy distortions. These covariates are exactly the same as those that appear in the vast theoretical and empirical literature on financial frictions. However, by matching firms that have different treatment status but are otherwise similar in terms of these covariates, we do not have to take a stand on the functional relations among these observed covariates and MRPK; neither do we need to specify the exact causal direction between the treatment status and the observed covariates.

...not surprisingly, a state-owned firm on average has an MRPK 42 percent lower than that of a domestic private-owned firm, where policy distortions and financial frictions lower its MRPK by 22 and 20 percent, respectively. More interestingly, the average MRPK of a foreign-owned firm is 2 percent lower than that of a domestic private-owned firm. But without policy distortions, its MRPK would be 20 percent higher than that of a domestic private-owned firm due to financial frictions. This suggests that foreign-owned firms in fact receive similar level of favorable policy distortions as state-owned firms.

there are six mutually exclusive ownership groups, namely state-owned firms (SOEs), collective-owned firms (COEs), domestic private-owned firms (DPEs), Hongkong, Macau and Taiwan-owned firms (HMTs) and foreign-owned firms (FIEs), if share of contributed capital from the corresponding ownerís type is larger than 50 percent, together with mixed ownership (MIXs), if none of the owners contributes more than 50 percent of capital.

even in the absence of policy distortions, financial frictions will cause the MRPK of the SOEs to be 20 percent lower than that of the DPEs, due to the advantageous firm characteristics of SOEs. The policy distortions cause the MRPK of the SOEs to be 32 percent further lower than that of the DPEs, so that the observed MRPK differences between SOEs and DPEs are enlarged to 42 percent.

The large and positive SB when HMT and FIE are taken as the treatment groups indicate that these two type of firms would be more financially constrained than DPE if there had been no policy distortions. This new finding is internally consistent with the firm characteristics listed in Table 2.3. First, HMT and FIE are the youngest among all type of firms. This implies that they face the highest cost of external finance according to the costly-state-verification rationale. Second, HMT and FIE have accumulated highest net worth among all type of firms. Notice that different from other firm characteristics, which are exogenous to a large extent, net worth is an endogenous state variable, which depends on firm's optimal consumption- investment decision. According to equation (A.1), if a firm faces persistently higher cost of external finance, it would be optimal for the firm to accumulate more internal funds as a self- financing device to undo the constraints

Да сравнить хотя бы уровень дискуссии с характерно российским, с мозгами, с одной стороны
поросшими убогим коротичем восьмидесятых, а с другой каким-то линдоном ларушем зараженные.

Уныние конечно охватывает, почему в Китае мои статьи тщательно изучают и применяют
с огромной для себя пользой, в то время как...
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